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Abstract. After Dung’s founding work in Abstract Argumentation Frameworks
there has been a growing interest in extending the Dung’s semantics in order to
describe more complex or real life situations. Several of these approaches take the
direction of weighted or probabilistic extensions. One of the most prominent prob-
abilistic approaches is that of constellation Probabilistic Abstract Argumentation
Frameworks from Li et al.
In this paper, we present a normal form for constellation probabilistic abstract
argumentation frameworks. Furthermore, we present a transformation from general
constellation probabilistic abstract argumentation frameworks to the presented nor-
mal form. In this way we illustrate that the simpler normal form has equal repre-
sentation power with the general one.
Keywords. Probabilistic Abstract Argumentation Frameworks, Constellation
Semantics, Normal Forms
1. Introduction
Argumentation is an everyday method of humanity to discuss and solve myriad differ-
ent situations where opinions or point of views conflict. Abstract Argumentation Frame-
works [9] (AAFs) aim in modeling everyday situations where information is inconsistent
or incomplete. Many different extensions of AAFs from Dung’s pioneering work have
appeared in order to describe different everyday situations. Sample works includes as-
sumption based argumentation [4], extending AAFs with support [21], introducing la-
bels [26]. Other approaches of extending AAFs have focused on introducing weights in
elements of the AAF, such as [2,3]. Such approaches are powerful tools to model voting
systems, belief in arguments and argument strength.
Knowledge representation with the use of probabilistic information has been used
in many areas of computer science. Probabilistic information, is a powerful medium to
represent knowledge. Similarly, many researchers have extended AAFs by adding prob-
abilistic information. These very prominent extensions of AAFs have been categorized
in two big groups by Hunter [13]: the epistemic approaches and the constellation ap-
proaches.
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The epistemic approaches, such as those presented in [24,14] describe probabilis-
tic AAFs that the uncertainty does not alter the structure of the AAFs. These type of
AAFs use the probability assignments to quantify the existing uncertainty of arguments
in AAFs and not to introduce new uncertainty.
The constellation approaches, such as those presented in [16,10,7,8,17] introduce
probabilistic elements in the AAF in such a way that the structure of the AAF becomes
uncertain. The constellation approaches generate a set of AAFs with a probabilistic distri-
bution and as such define a probabilistic distribution over the extensions of those AAFs.
In this paper we focus on the constellation approach from Li et al. [16]. [16] in-
troduced probabilistic elements to the structure of AAFs, resulting to a set of AAFs.
This allows for a set of arguments to be an (admissible, stable, ground, etc.) extension in
some of the AAFs that are represented by the constellation. This simple but yet powerful
representation has the ability to represent naturally many different uncertain scenarios.
The works of [16] and [13] can be considered as the pioneering work on combining
probabilities with AAFs. Our motivation for this work is to present a normal form for
PrAAFs that while simpler has the same expression power with general PrAAFs; we
also present a PrAAF to PrAAF transformation that allows any general PrAAF to be
converted to an equivalent PrAAF in normal form.
2. Preliminaries
2.1. Abstract Argumentation
An abstract argumentation framework [9] (AAF) is a tuple AAF = (Args,Atts) where
Args is a set of arguments and Atts a set of attacks among arguments of the form of
a binary relation Atts ⊆ Args × Args. For arguments a, b ∈ Args, we use a → b as
a shorthand to indicate (a, b) ∈ Atts and we say that argument a attacks argument b.
Figure 1 illustrates an example AAF.
a c
b
d
Figure 1. Exmaple AAF ({a, b, c, d}, {a → c, b → c, c → d}). Arguments are represented as cycles and
attacks as arrows. Arguments a, b are attacking argument c which attacks argument d.
A set of arguments S ⊆ Args is said to be conflict-free iff @a, b ∈ S where a→ b ∈
Atts. An argument a ∈ Args is acceptable with respect to set S ⊆ Args if no argument
attack a or if ∀b ∈ Args that ∃b→ a ∈ Atts then ∃c ∈ S where c→ b ∈ Atts.
Given the above [9] gives semantics to AAF by the use of extensions over subsets of
arguments. Dung first defines the admissible semantics. A set S ⊆ Args is admissible iff
S is conflict free and each a ∈ S is acceptable with respect to S. Following our example
AAF from Figure 1, the set {a, b, d} is admissible. Over time several different semantics
have been discussed such as complete, preferred, grounded, stable [9], semi-stable [6],
CF2 [12] etc.
2.2. Constellation based Probabilistic Abstract Argumentation Frameworks
Hunter [13], categorizes probabilistic abstract argumentation frameworks (PrAAFs) in
two different categories: the constellation and the epistemic PrAAFs. For this paper we
will focus on the constellation approaches and we base our work in the definition of
PrAAFs by [16].
A constellation approach to PrAAFs defines probabilities over the structure of the
AAF graph. One can assign probabilities to either the arguments or/and attacks of the
AAF. We refer to arguments/attacks with assigned probabilities less than 1 as proba-
bilistic arguments/attacks and we refer as probabilistic elements to either probabilistic
arguments or probabilistic attacks.
A probabilistic elment e exists in an AAF with probability P (e). These probabilistic
elements correspond to random variables, which are assumed to be mutually indepen-
dent2. As such, a PrAAF defines a probability distribution over a set of AAFs.
a c0.4
0.3
b
0.7
d
Figure 2. Example PrAAF ({a, b, c, d}, {1, 1, 0.4, 1}, {a → c, b → c, c → d}, {0.3, 0.7, 1}). Arguments
are represented as cycles and attacks as arrows.
Definition 1. Formally, a PrAAF is a tuple PrAAF = (Args, PArgs, Atts, PAtts)
where Args, Atts define an AAF, PArgs is a set of probabilities for each a ∈ Args
with 0 < PArgs(a) ≤ 1 and PAtts is a set of probabilities for each →∈ Atts with
0 < PAtts(→) ≤ 1.
Finally, stating an argument or an attack having probability 0 is redundant. A prob-
abilistic argument or attack with 0 probability is an argument or attack that is not part of
any AAF that the constellation represents. Figure 2, illustrates an example PrAAF with
3 different probabilistic elements.
As mentioned a PrAAF defines a probability distribution for all the possible non-
probabilistic AAFs it contains. Each single possible set of probabilistic elements (argu-
ments or attacks) of the PrAAF is called a possible world. Table 1 presents all possible
worlds for the example PrAAF of Figure 2. One can notice that having only three dif-
ferent probabilistic elements it generates eight possible worlds. The possible worlds of a
PrAAF are exponential in the number of probabilistic elements (2N whereN the number
of probabilistic elements).
Definition 2 (Probability of Possible World). The probability of a possible world equals
to the product of the probability of each probabilistic element that is in the possible
world with the product of one minus the probability of each probabilistic element that is
excluded from the possible world.
2As we are going to present later in the paper, the structure of AAF might impose dependencies among
otherwise assumed independent probabilistic elements.
AAF Possible World Prob. Admissible Sets
a
b
d ¬(a → c) ∧ ¬(b →
c) ∧ ¬c
0.126 {}, {a}, {b}, {d}, {a, b}, {a, d}, {b, d}, {a, b, d}
a c
b
d ¬(a → c) ∧ ¬(b →
c) ∧ c
0.084 {}, {a}, {b}, {c}, {a, b}, {a, c}, {b, c}, {a, b, c}
a
b
d ¬(a→ c)∧(b→ c)∧
¬c
0.294 {}, {a}, {b}, {d}, {a, b}, {a, d}, {b, d}, {a, b, d}
a c
b
d ¬(a→ c)∧(b→ c)∧
c
0.196 {}, {a}, {b}, {a, b}, {b, d}, {a, b, d}
a
b
d
(a→ c)∧¬(b→ c)∧
¬c
0.054 {}, {a}, {b}, {d}, {a, b}, {a, d}, {b, d}, {a, b, d}
a c
b
d
(a→ c)∧¬(b→ c)∧
c
0.036 {}, {a}, {b}, {a, b}, {a, d}, {a, b, d}
a
b
d
(a → c) ∧ (b → c) ∧
¬c
0.126 {}, {a}, {b}, {d}, {a, b}, {a, d}, {b, d}, {a, b, d}
a c
b
d
(a→ c)∧(b→ c)∧c 0.084 {}, {a}, {b}, {a, b}, {a, d}, {b, d}, {a, b, d}
Table 1. Possible worlds of our example PrAAF from Figure 2. Shaded rows, illustrate possible worlds that
generate an invalid AAF.
Pworld =
∏
ei∈AAFworld
P (ei) ·
∏
ej /∈AAFworld
(1− P (ej))
There has been extensive research on how to compute the probabilities without ex-
plicitly enumerating all possible worlds. We point out some works from Probabilistic
Logic Programming that is closely related with PrAAFs. For efficient exact inference we
direct the reader at [18,22,15,11,23], and for efficient approximate inference at [5,25,19].
2.3. Imposing Restrictions
Li et al. [16] further restrict the possible worlds to what is called induced AAFs. Further-
more, states that the probabilities Patts are conditional probabilites instead the likelihood
of existence. These restrictions appear as a separate definition, formally:
Definition 3 (Inducing an AAF from a PrAAF). An AAF (ArgsInd, AttsInd) is said to
be induced from a PrAAF (Args, PArgs, Atts, PAtts) iff all of the following hold:
1. ArgsInd ⊆ Args
2. AttsInd ⊆ Atts ∩ (ArgsInd ×ArgsInd)
3. ∀a ∈ Args such that PArgs(a) = 1, a ∈ ArgsInd
4. ∀a1 → a2 ∈ Atts such that PAtts(a1 → a2) = 1 and PArgs(a1) =
PArgs(a2) = 1, a1→ a2 ∈ AttsInd
Furthermore, PAtt(a1 → a2) is stated to be the conditional probability of the at-
tack existing when both attacking and attacked argument exist in the AAF (PAtt(a1 →
a2|a1, a2 ∈ ArgsInd)).
3. Normalizing Constellation Approaches
3.1. PrAAF Normal Forms
A simpler approach to restric the possible worlds without introducing extra restrictions
is to restrict PrAAFs only to probabilistic attacks and not probabilistic arguments.
Definition 4 (Probabilistic Attack Normal Form). A PrAAF P is in its probabilistic
attack normal form if it contains no probabilistic arguments (∀a ∈ Args, P (a) = 1).
As we illustrate later in the paper any PrAAF can be transformed to a normal form
PrAAF that has equivalent possible worlds and define equivalent probability distribution
over their admissible extensions. Thus we illustrate that normal form PrAAFs are both
the simplest but yet sufficient forms for representing any PrAAF.
4. Transforming General PrAAFs to Normal Form PrAAFs
In order to motivate our normal form for PrAAFs, we illustrate that any general PrAAF
can be represented to an equivalent normal form PrAAF. To do so, we present a transfor-
mation from any general PrAAF to an equivalent normal form PrAAF.
Our transformation proves, that we can represent as a normal form PrAAF an equiv-
alent constellation of AAFs with the exact same probabilistic distribution over their ex-
tensions that a general PrAAF would represent. This indicates that even with our simpler
definition for PrAAFs we can model all the same PrAAFs.
4.1. Transforming Probabilistic Arguments to Probabilistic Attacks
We present a transformation of probabilistic argument to probabilistic attack. We start by
defining a special argument called ground truth:
Definition 5 (Ground Truth). We introduce a special argument called Ground Truth
and shorthand it with the letter η. We say that η is undeniably true meaning that η is
never attacked by any argument and is always included in all extensions regardless the
semantics used.
The η argument restricts the extensions allowed by all semantics in such a way that
η is always included. For example, in the admissible semantics of an AAF without η a
valid extension is the empty set({}), but in an AAF that includes η the empty set is not a
valid extension under the admissible semantics and the equivalent extension is {η}.
Definition 6 (Acceptable Extensions). For AAFs that contain η, an acceptable extension
E is one that includes η (η ∈ E).
Transformation 1 (Probabilistic argument to probabilistic attack). Any PrAAF P , can
be transformed3 to an equivalent PrAAF P ′ by removing any probabilistic information
attached to an argument a ∈ Args, with P (a) and introducing a probabilistic attack
from the ground truth η to argument a with probability 1− P (a).
Definition 7. We notate P ≡σ|η P ′ the standard equivalence [20] of PrAAF P with
PrAAF P ′ under semantics σ by ignoring the existence of η in the acceptable extensions.
Theorem 1 (Equivalence of transformed PrAAF). A transformed PrAAF P ′ has an
equivalent distribution in terms of admissible sets containing η compared with the ad-
missible sets of the original PrAAF P .
Proof. We split the proof in two parts. First we show that PrAAF P generates AAFs
that have the same admissible sets with the generated AAFs from PrAAF P ′. We point
out that for PrAAF P ′ acceptable admissible sets are only the ones that contain the
ground truth argument which we ignore its existence when comparing admissible sets.
For example, the empty admissible set of P is equivalent with the {η} admissible set of
P ′. A probabilistic argument pa generates two different sets of AAFs, set S1 where pa
exists and S2 where pa does not exist.
PrAAF P ′ generates S′1 the equivalent sets of S1 when η → pa does not exist and
the equivalent S′2 sets of S2 when η → pa exists. When comparing an AAF with pa
versus an AAF without η → pa the only difference is the existence of η as we only
consider admissible sets that contain it and we ignore its existence in the admissible sets
the two graphs are equivalent thus the S′1 sets are equivalent with the S1 sets.
For S2 where pa does not exist, the equivalent S′2 contains AAFs where the argument
pa is been attacked by η and is not defended by any other argument. Clearly, as η is
included in every extension that we consider then every attack originating from pa is
defended; thus, the AAFs of S2 generate the same admissible extensions with the AAFs
of S′2.
Next part is to show that the probability of each extension is the same. The prob-
ability that a set is an admissible extension is been computed by the summation of the
possible worlds where that set is admissible. As S1, S2 are equivalent with S′1, S
′
2 and
produce equivalent AAFs then the possible worlds are equivalent too. The probability of
each possible world is also the same as when pa would exist the possible world proba-
bility is multiplied by P (pa). In the equivalent case the attack η → pa does not exist and
the possible world probability is multiplied by 1− (1− P (pa)) = pa. Similarly, for the
possible worlds that pa does not exist.
Corollary 1. PrAAF P ′ has equivalent acceptable extensions with PrAAF P for all se-
mantics where acceptability of an argument is necessary for the inclusion of the argu-
ment in the extension. Such semantics include: complete, preferred, ground and stable
semantics. Similarly, as the probabilistic distributions are equivalent then all acceptable
extensions of P ′ will have equal probability with their equivalent extension from P .
We also want to note that our transformation is a one-to-one reversible transfor-
mation. By one-to-one we mean that the transformation generates a unique equivalent
PrAAF from any PrAAF and vice versa, assuming that η is known.
3Such transformation is categorized as a normal expansion [1] of the original PrAAF.
Proposition 1 (Reversibility of the transformation). The probabilistic argument to prob-
abilistic attack transformation is reversible and creates a one-on-one equivalent PrAAF.
Proof. Obvious, one can reverse the transformation by just following the reverse steps of
the transformation.
η
c
0.6
a 0.3
b
0.7
d
Figure 3. Example transformed PrAAF ({a, b, c, d, η}, {1, 1, 1, 1, 1}, {a → c, b → c, c → d, η → c},
{0.3, 0.7, 1, 0.6}).
By using the probabilistic argument to probabilistic attack transformation on the
PrAAF of Figure 2 we get the PrAAF of Figure 3. Table 2 presents the possible worlds
of the PrAAF of Figure 3. Now, each possible world represents a valid AAF that gener-
ates the equivalent acceptable admissible sets like the original PrAAF. Furthermore, the
probabilistic distribution is identical.
Proposition 2 (Complexity of the Transformation). The probabilistic argument to prob-
abilistic attack transformation has linear complexityO(N) to the number of probabilistic
arguments N that the original PrAAF contains. It grows the size of the original PrAAF
by one argument and by N attacks. The transformation does not affect the worst case
complexity of computing any extension or the probability that a set is any type of an
extension.
5. Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper we have presented a normal form for PrAAFs that is simpler but equally ex-
pressive, and a transformation that converts any general PrAAF to an equivalent PrAAF
that is at a normal form. The presented normal form for PrAAFs is simpler than the gen-
eral PrAAFs and allow easier modeling. With our transformation we have illustrated that
the normal form can represent any general PrAAF and reproduce equal probability distri-
butions. Our motivation with this paper is to provide a simpler but equally powerful defi-
nition for constellation PrAAFs; furthermore, we give a clear insight in the constellation
semantics and its restrictions from the point of view of generating possible worlds.
For future work, we are going take advantage of the existing work from the prob-
abilistic logic programming community to provide an efficient system that implements
PrAAFs and also examine how the properties of AAF can be used to simplifying proba-
bilistic inference in PrAAFs.
AAF Possible World Prob. Acceptable Admissible Sets
η
ca
b
d ¬(a → c) ∧ ¬(b → c) ∧
(η → c) ≡ ¬(a → c) ∧
¬(b→ c) ∧ ¬c
0.126 {η}, {η, a}, {η, b}, {η, d}, {η, a, b},
{η, a, d}, {η, b, d}, {η, a, b, d}
η
ca
b
d ¬(a → c) ∧ ¬(b → c) ∧
¬(η → c) ≡ ¬(a → c) ∧
¬(b→ c) ∧ c
0.084 {η}, {η, a}, {η, b}, {η, c}, {η, a, b},
{η, a, c}, {η, b, c}, {η, a, b, c}
η
ca
b
d ¬(a → c) ∧ (b → c) ∧
(η → c) ≡ ¬(a → c) ∧
(b→ c) ∧ ¬c
0.294 {η}, {η, a}, {η, b}, {η, d}, {η, a, b},
{η, a, d}, {η, b, d}, {η, a, b, d}
η
ca
b
d ¬(a → c) ∧ (b → c) ∧
¬(η → c) ≡ ¬(a → c) ∧
(b→ c) ∧ c
0.196 {η}, {η, a}, {η, b}, {η, a, b}, {η, b, d},
{η, a, b, d}
η
ca
b
d (a → c) ∧ ¬(b → c) ∧
(η → c) ≡ (a → c) ∧
¬(b→ c) ∧ ¬c
0.054 {η}, {η, a}, {η, b}, {η, d}, {η, a, b},
{η, a, d}, {η, b, d}, {η, a, b, d}
η
ca
b
d (a → c) ∧ ¬(b → c) ∧
¬(η → c) ≡ (a → c) ∧
¬(b→ c) ∧ c
0.036 {η}, {η, a}, {η, b}, {η, a, b}, {η, a, d},
{η, a, b, d}
η
ca
b
d (a→ c)∧(b→ c)∧(η →
c) ≡ (a→ c)∧ (b→ c)∧
¬c
0.126 {η}, {η, a}, {η, b}, {η, d}, {η, a, b},
{η, a, d}, {η, b, d}, {η, a, b, d}
η
ca
b
d (a → c) ∧ (b → c) ∧
¬(η → c) ≡ (a → c) ∧
(b→ c) ∧ c
0.084 {η}, {η, a}, {η, b}, {η, a, b}, {η, a, d},
{η, b, d}, {η, a, b, d}
Table 2. Possible worlds after transforming PrAAF of Figure 2.
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